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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78~2a-3(2) (f) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS QF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court, in the course of taking Mr. 
Powell's guilty plea, strictly complied with the requirements 
set forth in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e). W1[T]he 
ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied 
with the constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of 
a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness.'" State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 
1999) (quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996)). 
In accordance with State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998), 
this Court can review Defendant's guilty plea for plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 318 (citing State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Norton, 675 
P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 
6 
(Utah 1983)); see also State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) . 
2. Whether the sentencing judge plainly erred by 
violating Article 1, § 7, of the Utah Constitution and Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 22(a) in the course of sentencing Mr. 
Powell. The sentencing judge's errors are reviewable for plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This case involves the question of whether the trial court, 
in the course of taking Mr. Powell's guilty plea, strictly 
complied with the requirements set forth in Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(e). Because of the trial court's failure 
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to strictly comply with those requirements, as set forth below, 
Mr. Powell's guilty plea was not voluntary. 
On February 22, 1999, Defendant, Daniel B. Powell, was 
charged with Retaliation Against Witness or Informant, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2), a third degree 
felony. Mr. Powell pleaded not guilty. 
On May 4, 1999, Mr. Powell appeared with appointed trial 
counsel for a hearing on a change of plea. During that hearing, 
the district court granted the State's request to amend the 
information to Attempted Retaliation Against Witness or 
Informant, a class A misdemeanor, after which a brief exchange 
ensued concerning the change of plea. 
On October 17, 2000, the district court sentenced Mr. 
Powell in absentia to one year in the county jail. According to 
the record, the district court's Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment was entered on October 17, 2000, even though it was 
not executed by the district court until October 19, 2000. 
On November 13, 2 000, Mr. Powell filed his pro se Notice of 
Intent to Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 22, 1999, Defendant, Daniel B. Powell, was 
charged with Retaliation Against Witness or Informant, in 
8 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2), a third degree felony 
(See R. 4-5, Information). 
2. Mr. Powell subsequently appeared for arraignment and 
pleaded not guilty (R. 18-19, Minutes of Arraignment). 
3. On May 4, 1999, Mr. Powell appeared with appointed 
trial counsel for a hearing on a change of plea (R. 2 0-21, 
Minutes - Change of Plea). 
4. During the hearing, the district court granted the 
State's request to amend the information to Attempted 
Retaliation Against Witness or Informant, a class A misdemeanor 
(R. 70, Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing (05/4/99), p. 1). 
5. At the change of plea hearing, the following exchange 
took place: 
THE COURT: Now you've been present, Mr. Powell, as 
I explained the rights that Mr. 
Bradshaw had in this court, number 14 
on the calendar. Did you hear me do 
that? 
MR. POWELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Did you understand those rights? 
MR. POWELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand they apply to you just 
as they did to Mr. Bradshaw? 
MR. POWELL: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: You understand if you enter a plea of 
guilty to this amended charge that you 
will be giving up those rights? 
MR, POWELL: Yes, sir. 
•k ic -k "k ic 
(See id. at R. 70, pp. 1-2). 
6. On October 17, 2000, the district court sentenced Mr. 
Powell in absentia pursuant to Mr. Powell's Consent to 
Sentencing in Absentia (R. 41-42, Consent to Sentencing in 
Absentia). The district court sentenced Mr. Powell to one year 
in the county jail, which sentence "is to run consecutive with 
the charges in Case #991700002 (R. 43-44, Minutes - Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment (Emphasis added)). 
7. The district court's Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment, according to the Certified Copy of the Docket in the 
record, was entered on October 17, 2000, even though the 
Judgment was not executed by the district court until October 
19, 2000 (Id.). 
8. On November 13, 2000, Mr. Powell filed his pro se 
Notice of Intent to Appeal (R. 48-49, Notice of Intent to 
Appeal). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court committed plain error in the instant 
case by failing to personally establish on the record that Mr. 
Powell understood the constitutional rights that he waived by 
pleading guilty. Although the trial court generally referred to 
a waiver of constitutional rights by pleading guilty, it failed 
to specifically and personally discuss with Mr. Powell each of 
those constitutional rights as they apply to Mr. Powell to 
ensure a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its 
consequences. Because the trial court failed to inform Mr. 
Powell of his constitutional rights, the trial court also 
necessarily failed to determine whether the guilty plea was 
voluntarily made. 
The trial court also failed to make the requisite inquiry 
and finding that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction. This requirement is 
of particular import in the instant case because Mr. Powell 
refused to admit culpability or plead guilty to the elements of 
the crime. 
In addition to the plain and mandatory language of Rule 
11(e), the obviousness of the trial court's errors are 
demonstrated by the numerous cases addressing Rule 11(e). 
Consequently, it should have been obvious that the failure to 
11 
specifically inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights 
prior to any waiver and the failure to establish a substantial 
risk of conviction constituted plain error. 
Because the trial court failed, among other things, to 
inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights and because the 
trial court failed to obtain a waiver of those constitutional 
rights, Mr. Powell was not fully informed of the consequences of 
his plea and his plea therefore cannot be considered voluntary. 
Inasmuch as the guilty plea was involuntary the trial court's 
errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell. 
2. Rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court 
to "afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and 
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to 
show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before 
imposing sentence. Moreover, the due process clause of Article 
1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a 
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence. 
Before imposing sentence, the court heard from neither 
defense counsel nor the prosecutor concerning any information in 
mitigation of punishment or any other information material to 
the imposition of sentence. Further, at no time during the 
sentencing hearing did the court reference the Presentence 
12 
Investigation Report, which had been previously prepared for the 
very purpose of sentencing. 
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor 
the opportunity of presenting information material to the 
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error. 
Based on the plain and clear language of Article 1, § 7, of the 
Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the errors committed by 
the sentencing judge was obvious. Finally, the sentencing 
judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell inasmuch as both 
he, through counsel, and the prosecutor were precluded from 
presenting information prior to sentencing, which is a critical 
stage of the criminal proceedings. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING 
TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 
11 IN THE COURSE OF TAKING MR. POWELL'S GUILTY 
PLEA. 
A. The Trial Court's Rule 11 Duty of Strict 
Compliance. 
Rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
"'squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11 (e) requirements are complied with 
when a guilty plea is entered. "' State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 
556, 558 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
13 
1312 (Utah 1987) ) . The trial court must strictly adhere to the 
requirements of Rule 11(e). See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 
372 (Utah 1996). The basis of the trial court's duty is found 
in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969), where 
the United States Supreme Court stated: "What is at stake for 
an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of 
which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the 
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the 
plea connotes and of its consequence." Id. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 
at 1712-13. 
In State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
this Court stated: 
Under the . . . strict compliance test, 
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court 
must review on the record with the defendant at 
the time the plea is taken the nature and 
elements of the offense, the constitutional 
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives by 
pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties. 
Id. at 778. "The trial judge bears the burden of establishing, 
on the record, strict compliance with Rule 11(e)." State v. 
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Rule 11(e) mandates the following: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has 
found: 
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(1) if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right 
to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the 
right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is 
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A 
factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by 
the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish 
a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum 
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea 
is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, 
what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw the 
plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right 
of appeal is limited. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
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B. Review for Plain Error or Exceptional 
Circumstances. 
Notwithstanding a defendant's failure to timely file a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this Court, in accordance with 
State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998), can review 
Defendant's guilty plea for plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. Id. at 318 (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Norton, SIS P.2d 577, 
581 (Utah 1983); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 
1983)); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
see also State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d 1065, aff'd 
as to result only, 2001 UT 69, f13. To prevail on a claim of 
plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing u(i) An error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the 
verdict is undermined. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993); see also Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318; State v. 
Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v. 
Tenney, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). According to State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989), in most 
circumstances, the term "manifest injustice" found in Utah R. 
16 
Crim. P. 19(c) is synonymous with the "plain error" standard 
expressly set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). 
C. The Trial Court Failed to Personally Establish 
Mr. Powell's Understanding of his Constitutional 
Rights and Obtain a Waiver of those Rights. 
The trial court committed plain error in the instant case 
by failing to personally establish on the record that Mr. Powell 
understood the constitutional rights that he waived by pleading 
guilty. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). At the change of plea 
hearing in the instant case, the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: Now you've been present, Mr. Powell, as 
I explained the rights that Mr. 
Bradshaw had in this court, number 14 
on the calendar. Did you hear me do 
that? 
MR, POWELL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
Yes, sir. 
Did you understand those rights? 
Yes, sir. 
You understand they apply to you just 
as they did to Mr. Bradshaw? 
Yes, sir. 
You understand if you enter a plea of 
guilty to this amended charge that you 
will be giving up those rights? 
Yes, sir. 
* * * * * 
17 
(See R. 70, Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing (05/4/99), pp. 
1-2) . 
Although the trial court generally referred to a waiver of 
constitutional rights by pleading guilty, it failed to 
specifically discuss each of those constitutional rights as they 
apply to Mr. Powell to ensure a full understanding of what the 
plea connotes and its consequences. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 
1312 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 
1712-13 (1969)). In light of the trial court's duty to canvass 
the rights set forth in Rule 11, it is insufficient to permit a 
guilty plea to be entered against a defendant by allowing the 
trial court to merely refer to a discussion of constitutional 
rights that took place in another proceeding with another 
defendant. Id. at 1313 (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 
637, 659, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2260 (1976)); see also State v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) 
(stating that "[sjpecific inquiry should be made as to whether 
defendant understands that by his plea he waived his rights 
against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to appeal, and to 
confront witnesses."). 
18 
D. The Trial Court Failed to Determine that Mr. 
Powell's Plea was Voluntarily Made, 
Because the trial court failed to inform Mr. Powell of his 
constitutional rights, the trial court also necessarily failed 
to determine whether the guilty plea was voluntarily made. See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2). The conclusory assertions made by 
the trial court that Mr. Powell entered the guilty plea of his 
"own free will and choice and knowingly" are insufficient under 
Rule 11(e)(2). See Valencia, 116 P.2d at 1335. Because " [a] 
guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed," 
defendant's guilty plea was involuntary. State v. Breckenridge, 
688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983). 
E, The Trial Court Failed to Determine That There 
Was Sufficient Evidence to Establish a 
Substantial Risk of Conviction. 
The trial court also failed to make the requisite inquiry 
and finding that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction. See Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(e)(4)(B); see Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444 (ux [B]ecause a 
guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal 
criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the 
defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to 
the facts.'" (alteration in original) (quoting McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969) 
19 
(footnote omitted)); see also Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335 
(stating that a defendant's "understanding of the elements of 
the charges and the relationship of the law and the facts may 
not be presumed from silent or incomplete examination."). 
This requirement is of particular import in the instant 
case inasmuch as Mr. Powell refused to admit culpability or 
plead guilty to the elements of the crime (See R. 70, Transcript 
of Change of Plea Hearing (05/4/99), pp. 3-4). In light of Mr. 
Powell's refusal, the trial court was required to inquire 
further about the dispute concerning the evidence to be provided 
by the prosecution at trial and then determine if there was 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). 
P. The Errors Committed in the Course of Taking 
Mr. Powell's Guilty Plea Should Have Been 
Obvious to the Trial Court. 
Based on the plain and well-settled Rule 11(e) strict 
compliance standard that governs the taking of guilty pleas, the 
trial court committed obvious error when it failed to inform Mr. 
Powell of his constitutional rights to be waived by a guilty 
plea. Moreover, the trial court plainly erred when it failed to 
inquire and make the requisite finding that the prosecution had 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction. In addition to the plain and mandatory language of 
20 
Rule 11(e), the obviousness of the trial court's errors are 
demonstrated by the numerous cases addressing Rule 11 (e) . 
Consequently, it should have been obvious that the failure to 
specifically inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights 
prior to any waiver and the failure to establish a substantial 
risk of conviction constituted plain error. 
G. The Trial Court's Errors Prejudiced Mr. Powell. 
The constitutional rights set forth in Rule 11(e) (3) are 
among those u'constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial 
that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181 
(1978) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43, 87 S.Ct. 
824, 837 (1967)). Because the trial court failed, among other 
things, to inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights and 
because the trial court failed to obtain a waiver of those 
constitutional rights, Mr. Powell was not fully informed of the 
consequences of his plea and his plea therefore cannot be 
considered voluntary. See State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 
(Utah 1989); State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 
1983); and State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). Inasmuch as the guilty plea was involuntary the trial 
court's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell. See State v. 
21 
Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d 1065, aff'd as to result only, 
2001 UT 69, f26. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. POWELL'S 
CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND UTAH RULE 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(a) IN THE COURSE OF 
SENTENCING MR. POWELL. 
The second paragraph of Rule 22 (a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states: 
Before imposing sentence the court 
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment, or 
to show any legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney 
shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the 
imposition of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Because Mr. Powell was involuntarily 
absent and unable to personally attend his sentencing, he did 
not waive the right to make a statement at sentencing or present 
information in mitigation of punishment or to show legal cause 
why sentence should not be imposed. Cf. State v. Anderson, 92 9 
P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1996); see also State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 
1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (holding that *[s]entencing is a critical 
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled 
to the effective assistance of counsel77) . 
Rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court to 
''afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
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present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show 
any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before 
imposing sentence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Moreover, 
u[t]he due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in 
fixing a sentence/7 State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 
1985); see also State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980) (discussing consideration of defendant's background and 
crime committed for sentence to be appropriate and to serve the 
interests of society); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 
(Utah 1980) (requiring disclosure of presentence report to 
defendant prior to sentencing). 
At sentencing in this case, the sentencing judge recognized 
that Mr. Powell was involuntarily absent (See R. 70, Sentencing 
Transcript (10/17/00), p. 1); see also R. 41-42, Consent to 
Sentencing in Absentia). After briefing discussing Mr. Powell's 
involuntary absence and the consent to sentencing in absentia, 
the sentencing judge then proceeded to impose sentence (See R. 
70, Sentencing Transcript (10/17/00), pp. 1-3). Before imposing 
sentence, the court heard from neither defense counsel nor the 
prosecutor concerning "any information in mitigation of 
punishment" or "any [other] information material to the 
23 
imposition of sentence." See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Further, 
at no time during the sentencing hearing did the court reference 
the Presentence Investigation Report, which had been previously 
prepared for the very purpose of sentencing (See R. 73-94, 
Presentence Investigation Report). By not providing the 
prosecutor the opportunity to present information material to 
sentencing, the sentencing judge precluded the prosecutor from 
recommending that Mr. Powell's sentence in this case run 
concurrent with the sentence in Mr. Powell's other case as 
represented by prosecutor in the course of plea negotiations 
(See R. 70, Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing (5/7/99), pp. 
4-5). In fact, the sentence imposed by the court was 
consecutive (See R. 43-44, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor 
the opportunity of presenting information material to the 
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error. 
To prevail on a claim of plain error, as previously discussed 
above, a defendant must show "(i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or 
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
24 
Based on the plain and clear language of Rule 22(a), 
Article 1, § 7, of the Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the 
errors committed by the sentencing judge were obvious. Cf. 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ff27-36. Finally, the 
sentencing judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell 
inasmuch as both he, through counsel, and the prosecutor were 
precluded from presenting information prior to sentencing, which 
is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. A likelihood 
of a more favorable result or sentence for Mr. Powell is 
demonstrated by the prosecutor's recommendation concerning a 
concurrent sentence that was supposed to be made to the court as 
represented during plea negotiations. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Powell respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate his conviction obtain by way of the 
invalid guilty plea and remand the case for further proceedings 
and for such other relief as the Court deems just and 
appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of December, 2001. 
alGGINS, P.C. s£Tns 
Attorneys^fc^r Appellant 
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1 FARMINGTON, UTAH - MAY 4, 1999 
2 HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: State of Utah v. Daniel B, Powell, this 
5 is the time set for sentence. 
6 MR. CELLA: Your Honor, can we address the pretrial 
7 conference first and then the sentencing? 
8 THE COURT: We can. 
9 MR. CELLA: Ifm going to ask the Court to amend the 
10 only cpunt to attempted tampering which is a class A 
11 misdemeanor and then enter a plea guilty to the amended charge. 
12 MR. MCGUIRE: That is correct, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Court will amend the information then to 
14 attempted retaliation, a class A misdemeanor. 
15 Do you have any objection to the amendment, Mr. 
16 Powell? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
18 THE COURT: As amended that becomes a class A 
19 misdemeanor, which alleges that you attempted to communicate to 
20 a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be 
21 a threat to do bodily injury to the person because of any act 
22 performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a 
23 witness, informant or in an official proceeding or 
24 investigation. 
25 J Now you've been present, Mr. Powell, as I explained 
1 
1 the rights that Mr. Bradshaw had in this court, number 14 on 
2 the calendar. Did you hear me do that? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: Did you understand those rights? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: You understand they apply to you just as 
7 they did to Mr. Bradshaw? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: You understand if you enter a plea of 
10 guilty to this amended charge that you will be giving up those 
11 rights? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: You understand if you plead guilty there 
14 will be no trial and no witnesses will be called and that 
15 you'll be relieving the prosecutor of proving this attempted 
16 retaliation against a witness or informant because you will be 
17 admitting that charge. Do you understand those things? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: I understand, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: The Court would inform you, Mr. Powell, 
20 that once you've entered a guilty plea, your right to appeal is 
21 limited. And once that guilty plea is entered, the only appeal 
22 you could take as of right is as to whether or not you entered 
23 the guilty plea of your own free will and choice. Do you 
24 understand that? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: I understand, Your Honor. 
1 THE COURT: Now in order to convict you of this 
2 charge, the State would have to prove the following things 
3 beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously to a jury. They 
4 would have to show that you were in Davis County on March 19, 
5 1999. They would have to show that you attempted to 
6 communicate to a person a threat that a reasonable person would 
7 believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to that person 
8 because of any act performed or to be performed by the person 
9 in his or her capacity as a witness or an informant in an 
10 official proceeding or investigation and that you did that 
11 knowingly and intentionally. Those are what we call the 
12 elements of this particular charge. Do you understand those 
13 elements? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
15 THE COURT: Keeping them in mind, Mr. Powell, are you 
16 entering a plea of guilty in this matter because you feel 
17 you're guilty of those elements? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: It would be more accurate to say is 
19 that I'm pleading guilty to take advantage of the plea bargain 
20 to a misdemeanor crime; correct? 
21 MR. MCGUIRE: That's correct, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: You have a right to do that, Mr. Powell, 
23 so long as you understand that if you wanted to you could put 
24 the State to their prove on the original charge. Do you 
25 understand that? 
3 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yesf sir. 
2 THE COURT: And with that understanding is it your 
3 desire to take advantage of a more favorable charge and enter a 
4 plea of guilty to that? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: You understand as a class A misdemeanor 
7 this carries a possible penalty of up to one year in the county 
8 jail and a fine of up to $2,500? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: I understand, sir. 
10 THE COURT: Has anyone promised you what sentence I 
11 would impose? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. They have just suggested 
13 that it would be run concurrent with my other charges. 
14 THE COURT: That is a possibility, but you need to 
15 recognize that that is not a guarantee, and when it comes to 
16 sentence, that issue would be left to the court. Do you 
17 understand that? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
19 MR. CELLA: Let me state that I made that 
20 representation to him and that's because Mr. McGuire made that 
21 representation to me that he would recommend concurrent on this 
22 case with the sentence to be imposed on the other case. 
23 THE COURT: He may make that recommendation, but Mr. 
24 Powell needs to understand that I am not bound by any 
25 I recommendations of either defense counsel or of the state's 
4 
1 counsel. Do you understand that, Mr. Powell? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. Can I ask my 
3 attorney a question? 
4 THE COURT: You certainly may. 
5 MR. CELLA: He asked me for my opinion on whether or 
6 not you would, and I said I thought it likely. 
7 THE COURT: Generally, they are run concurrent, but 
8 you need to understand that that is not a guarantee, Mr. 
9 Powell. 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs 
12 or alcohol, now being treated for any mental illness or taking 
13 any prescribed medication? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: I take prescribed medications, sir. 
15 THE COURT: And what do you take? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Hydrocodone for pain, sir. 
17 THE COURT: Is that any way interfere with your 
18 ability to understand what's going on here today? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I'm completely cognitive of 
20 what's going on here. 
21 THE COURT: Are there any questions you wish to ask 
22 Mr. Cella or myself about this plea before we go further? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. McGuire, what are the facts that 
25 j would support a guilty plea? 
5 
1 MR. MCGUIRE: Your Honor, on March 19, the defendant 
2 was before this court on a trial. During that trial an officer 
3 testified. After the trial was over the defendant came in 
4 contact with the officer outside the courtroom and told the 
5 officer that he would see him again on some dark night. The 
6 demeanor of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding 
7 that statement lead the officer to believe that it was a threat 
8 against him. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Cella, are those the facts that you 
10 think the state would present in this matter? 
11 MR. CELLA: They are, your Honor, and Mr. Powell 
12 admits making the statement, but his position was that when he 
13 first came into contact with the officer, it was also a dark 
14 night, so he doesn't think - he didn't make it in his point, 
15 from his point of reference with the threat in a reckless 
16 [inaudible] statute, but is willing to plead guilty to take 
17 advantage of the plea. 
18 THE COURT: The Court will find that those facts 
19 would support a plea of guilty in this matter as amended. The 
20 Court will ask you then, having explained your rights to you, 
21 Mr. Powell, is it still your desire to enter a plea of guilty 
22 to this amended charge? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, to take advantage of the 
24 proposed arrangements I would, sir. 
25 J THE COURT: And to the charge of attempted 
6 
1 retaliation against a witness or informant, a class A 
2 misdemeanor, what is your plea? Guilty or not guilty? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: I will find that you entered a guilty 
5 plea, that you've done so of your own free will and choice and 
6 knowingly. The Court will inform you as you've heard me inform 
7 others, Mr. Powell, that you have 30 days in which you could 
8 ask to withdraw the guilty plea. That's not automatic. I 
9 won't let you do it just because you change your mind. You'd 
10 have to show good cause and then it would be up to me. Do you 
11 understand that? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: You also have a right to be sentenced in 
14 not less than two nor more than 45 days. You may waive that 
15 right and ask for a pre-sentence report. What is your desire, 
16 Mr. Cella? 
17 MR. CELLA: We do need the pre-sentence report. We 
18 would ask that he also be referred on 991700002. 
19 THE COURT: We'll find that the defendant has waived 
20 his right to be sentenced within the statutory time on this 
21 matter. We'll refer the defendant to Adult Probation and 
22 Parole for a pre-sentence report. The Court further notes that 
23 in case number 991700002 the defendant has failed to report to 
24 adult probation and parole. The Court, however, will give him 
25 I the opportunity to be re-referred on that matter, and will 
7 
refer him on that matter also based upon his plea of guilty to 
I think it was - or his finding of guilty, possession of a 
dangerous weapon, use of drug paraphernalia, and illegal use or 
possession of controlled substance. He's to be referred on 
those matters also and it will come back to the court for the 
purposes of sentence on the 8th of June, 1999. So Mr. Powell, 
you need to be back here on that date. Do I have your word do 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you still residing in Wyoming? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That will be the order of the Court then. 
We'll see you back on that date. 
MR. CELLA: I'm sorry, could we go to the 15th 
instead of the 8th for him? 
THE COURT: I have no problem with that. Ms. Hugo is 
here and she'll take that referral. Set an appointment for 
you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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TabC 
1 FARMINGTON, UTAH - OCTOBER 17, 2000 
2 HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: State of Utah v. Daniel B. Powell. This 
5 is the time set for sentencing. A warrant is outstanding in 
6 this matter. Has that been served yet? Do we know? 
7 MR. CELLA: It has been served, your Honor. On this 
8 case, I spoke with Mr. McGuire a couple of weeks ago. Mr. 
9 Powell is in federal custody in Pennsylvania, I believe, and I 
10 spoke with Mr. McGuire about getting him sentenced in 
11 abstention and allow it to run concurrent. He indicated a 
12 willingness to do so. You, I spoke with you and you .said let's 
13 get something from him in writing and it should be in the file 
14 now, giving a notarized consent to allow sentencing to proceed 
15 in his absence. 
16 THE COURT: I do have the consent to sentencing in 
17 absentiate. It is signed by Mr. Powell and notarized on the 
18 26th of September of this year. 
19 MR. CELLA: It sets forth his earliest release date, 
20 which my recollection is 2004, I think. I would ask for 
21 sentencing today and allow it to run current with his federal 
22 commitment in Pennsylvania. 
23 THE COURT: Based upon the pre-sentence report that 
24 was previously prepared in this matter, the Court will sentence 
25 the defendant to one year in the county jail on the tampering 
1 
with a witness charge. I will suspend all of the fine. I will 
sentence him to six months in the county jail on possession of 
paraphernalia and possession of controlled substance. The 
Court will order that the two class B misdemeanors are to run 
concurrent and that the class A misdemeanor is to run 
consecutive to the class B misdemeanors. The Court will order 
that they all run concurrent with his present prison sentence. 
MR. MCGUIRE: Thank you, judge. 
MR. CELLA: And with that, is the Court willing to 
release its hold? 
THE COURT: I am. 
MR. CELLA: Letfs see. I think that, your Honor, 
there's also a Mr. Powell, there's also a third degree, the 
possession of a handgun by a restricted person. 
THE COURT: Looks like we do have another one. 
MR. CELLA: He was convicted of counts 1, 2 and 3 and 
4 were dismissed. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. CELLA: Found not guilty. 
THE COURT: I think we need to redo this to clarify 
that sentence in the matter so it's done appropriately. Let's 
look first of all, in the sentence first of all in the case of 
991700002. In that matter, the defendant plead guilty to the 
charge of possession of dangerous weapon, a third degree 
felony. And on that case, the Court will sentence the 
1 defendant to zero to five years in the state prison. I will 
2 suspend all of the fine. I will order that that time to run 
3 concurrent with his federal sentence. 
4 In case number 991700300, the Court will sentence the 
5 defendant - excuse me, on 002 there was also a class B 
6 misdemeanor of paraphernalia and a class B misdemeanor of 
7 possession charge, as I understand. 
8 MR. CELLA: That's correct. 
9 THE COURT: Is that correct? 
10 MR. CELLA: That's correct. And those are guilty 
11 verdicts from a trial, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: That's right. And the Court will order 
13 that those sentences, six months in the county jail on each of 
14 the two counts are to run concurrent with each other and 
15 concurrent with the third degree felony. 
16 MR. CELLA: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: Due to the nature of the offense of 
18 tampering with a witness occurring specifically on - involving 
19 threats made to a state trooper, in case number 00300, the 
20 Court will sentence the defendant to one year in the county 
21 jail, suspend all of the fine, and order that that run 
22 consecutive to the third degree felony charge. All sentences 
23 to run concurrent with the federal offense. 
24 MR. CELLA: Okay, thank you, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: All right. 
26 (Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
